




(In)Sicurezza Informatica dei dispositivi

Dalle IP camere alle automobili
connesse

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Ricercatore

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Domanda semplice: cosa fa questo codice?

```
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
    volatile int modified;
    char buffer[64];

    modified = 0;
    gets(buffer);
}
```



Domanda semplice: cosa fa questo codice?

Esponde una vulnerabilità

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Stack area



Domanda semplice: cosa fa questo codice?


Esponde una vulnerabilità

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int main(int argc, char **argv)
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0xbffff7d0 (argc argv):

Stack area



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0xbffff7d0 (argc argv):

0x00000001 0xbffff874

0xbffff7cc (\$eip):

0xb7eadc76

Stack area

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Stack area

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Esponde una vulnerabilità

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```
0xbffff7d0 (argc argv):
0xbffff7cc ($eip):
0xbffff7c8 ($ebp):
    locals ($ebp-4):
    ($ebp-68):
```

Stack area

0x00000001	0xbffff874
0xb7eadc76	
0xbffff848	
0x00000000	
0x08048450 ... 0x08049620	

Domanda semplice: cosa fa questo codice?

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Caso studio: IP Camera Tenda CP3




Caso studio: IP Camera Tenda CP3

Analisi di sicurezza della telecamera

1. [HW] Trovare interfacce sulla videocamera
2. [HW] Ottenere quante più informazioni dalla camera
3. [HW] (Se possibile) acquisire firmware
4. [SW] Analizzare servizi aperti
5. [SW] Definire exploit
6. [SW] Elevazione di privilegi



Caso Studio: IP Camera Tenda CP3



Caso Studio: IP Camera Tenda CP3

```
minicom bootlog

ROM:    Use nor flash.

U-Boot 2010.06-dirty (Sep 07 2021 - 16:46:09)
DRAM: 64 MiB
Press 'E' to stop autoboot
verify flash image OK



load kernel 0x00050000(0x002e0000) to 0xa1000000
## Booting kernel from Legacy Image at a1000000 ...
   Image Name:   Linux-3.0.8
   Created:      2021-09-07   8:49:48 UTC
   Image Type:   ARM Linux Kernel Image (uncompressed)
OK
```

```
minicom bootlog

6 cmdlinepart partitions found on MTD device spi_flash
Creating 6 MTD partitions on "spi_flash":
0x0000000000000-0x0000000010000 : "bootstrap"
0x0000000010000-0x0000000020000 : "uboot-env"
0x0000000020000-0x0000000050000 : "uboot"
0x0000000050000-0x00000000350000 : "kernel"
0x00000000350000-0x000000003d0000 : "data"
0x000000003d0000-0x00000000800000 : "app"

Please press Enter to activate this console.
(none) login:
```

Caso Studio: IP Camera Tenda CP3



Caso Studio: IP Camera Tenda CP3

```
super_secure_script.sh

if [ -d /mnt/sd/upgrade ] ; then
  if [ -f /mnt/sd/upgrade/img_up ] ; then
    cp /mnt/sd/upgrade/img_up /home/
    chmod +x /home/img_up
  fi
  if [ -f /mnt/sd/upgrade/iu.sh ] ; then
    cp /mnt/sd/upgrade/iu.sh /home/
  elif [ -f /usr/bin/iu.sh ] ; then
    cp /usr/bin/iu.sh /home/
  elif [ -f $cur_dir/iu.sh ] ; then
    cp $cur_dir/iu.sh /home/
  fi
  if [ -f /home/iu.sh ] ; then
    chmod +x /home/iu.sh
    /home/iu.sh -s
  fi
  rm -f /home/iu.sh
  rm -f /home/iu_s.sh
```



Caso Studio: IP Camera Tenda CP3



CVE ID	Nome	CVSS
CVE-2023-30351	Remote access via hard-coded credentials	7.5 HIGH
CVE-2023-30352	RTSP feed access via hard-coded credentials	9.8 CRITICAL
CVE-2023-30353	Unauthenticated RCE	9.8 CRITICAL
CVE-2023-30354	Physical access and WiFi credentials disclosure	9.8 CRITICAL
CVE-2023-30356	Missing support for Integrity Check	7.5 HIGH




<https://github.com/SECloudUNIMORE/ACES/tree/master/Tenda>

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Case Study: Automotive

(very old) PoC: Denial of Service



(very old) PoC: ECU Spoofing



```
CAN 32 STD: 0x0000110 01 30 00 02 08 f0 c0 0f
CAN 32 STD: 0x0000198 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
CAN 32 STD: 0x00001a0 00 00 00 01 03 00 00 00
CAN 32 STD: 0x00001ca 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
CAN 32 STD: 0x00001d8 00 31 02 02 86 31 0f 9e
```

bits), 32 bytes captured (256 bits) on interface can0, id 0



```
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0c .....U
00 00 00 04 00 00 00 55 .....U
Progress> Packets: 749570 - Displayed: 749570 (100.0%) - Profile: Default
```

2: Terminal ▾

```
^C
+ logs vim script.sh
+ logs ./script.sh
^C
+ logs vim script.sh
+ logs ./script.sh
^C
+ logs vim script.sh
+ logs ./script.sh
^C
+ logs ./script.sh
^C
+ logs vim script.sh
+ logs ./script.sh
^C
+ logs ./script.sh
^C
+ logs ./script.sh
^C
+ logs cansend can0 1E0#1B
+ logs cansend can0 1E1#41
+ logs ./script.sh
^C
+ logs
```








FF-897NB

VOLVO





Privacy nei sistemi automotive



Privacy nei sistemi automotive

